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Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank that he created in 1983 were awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 2006. The Grameen Bank￿ s main activity consists on granting loans to poor people in
Bangladesh. Leaving aside the social implications of this activity, the most striking feature of
this bank is the unusually high reported repayment rate, 98%, compared to that achieved in the
US banking sector, 96%.1 Although this repayment rate may be due to di⁄erent accounting and
reporting standards, the actual repayment rate of micro￿nance institutions, 92%, is high relative
to other lending institutions in Bangladesh, 75%.2
Many empirical and theoretical studies have focused on group liability as the main reason for
high repayment rates in micro￿nance programs. Borrowers from micro￿nance programs have usu-
ally been organized in groups, whose members are liable for each other￿ s default. Group liability
has been argued to increase borrowers￿incentives to screen, monitor and repay the loans, exploiting
their knowledge about the local conditions. It must be highlighted that, from a theoretical per-
spective, group liability also introduces a free rider problem in the repayment of the loan. Overall,
evidence concerning the performance of group liability contracts is at best mixed.3 It is important
to note that, nowadays, the Grameen Bank and other micro￿nance institutions explicitly rule out
group liability.4
Leaving aside group liability, our paper highlights a novel explanation for the high repayment
rate of the micro￿nance programs. We build on the observation that borrowers in these programs
have one common characteristic: they are poor individuals living in rural areas. This has two
important implications: (i) poor individuals have current and future income and (ii) because they
live in rural areas, accessing savings technologies from urban banks is not possible. A micro￿nance
1Sources: www.grameen-info.org and www.fdic.com.
2Source: Household Survey of the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies.
3See Morduch (1999), Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2005), and Gine and Karlan (2006) for a summary
of the empirical evidence.
4As stated on the Grameen Bank￿ s web page ￿... there is no form of joint liability, i.e. group members are not
responsible to pay on behalf of a defaulting member￿.
1bank that lends and takes deposits increases the current income of the individuals by giving them
the opportunity to undertake investment activities through borrowing. A micro￿nance bank also
increases the future income of the borrowers, as it provides them with a savings technology that
allows individuals to transfer part of their current income to the future.
We argue that deposit taking is an important, and frequently overlooked, side of the relationship
between the micro￿nance bank and poor individuals.5 In rural areas of Bangladesh saving outside
the banking sector has been argued to be unpro￿table due to causes such as the high probability
of natural disasters, in￿ ation, and theft.6 We claim that poorer individuals in the population are
the ones that value more the opportunity to increase their low future income by depositing their
savings in the micro￿nance bank. From here we conclude that poorer individuals must have higher
repayment rates on their loans in order to maintain their relationship with the micro￿nance bank
and bene￿t from the savings mechanism.
We propose a theoretical model with overlapping generations of individuals living for three
dates. Individuals receive a loan from the bank when they are young, and repaying the loan allows
them to access the savings technology o⁄ered by the bank and increase their income when old. Our
￿rst theoretical result states that borrowers with worse future prospects (henceforth low outside
options) are those most likely to repay the loan because accessing the savings technology is more
valuable to them. Borrowers endowed with better outside options are more prone to default, as
saving is less valuable for them and defaulting on the loan increases their current income.
Building on this result on borrowers￿repayment behavior, we study its implications in an
in￿nitely lived, risk neutral, monopolistic banking sector. We characterize the transition to steady
state of a ￿nancially constrained bank ￿nancing its lending only with deposits taken from its
borrowers and from retained earnings. During the transition to the steady state, the bank does
not disburse any dividends and reinvests all the pro￿ts in increasing the loan supply. Our results
5One exception is the empirical study by Kaboski and Townsend (2005).
6See Banerjee and Du￿ o (2006).
2closely match the evidence that the Grameen Bank has not paid out dividends since its foundation,
and are in line with the high growth it has achieved. The ￿rst year in which the Grameen Bank
paid dividends was 2006. At the end of this year the Grameen Bank was present in more than
95% of all the villages in Bangladesh.
Our second theoretical result highlights that a bank which is able to distinguish between bor-
rowers￿groups with di⁄erent distributions of outside options obtains higher pro￿ts by lending to
groups whose distribution is worse. It is straightforward to reason that in the context of our model
the best performing borrowers, those with the worse distribution of their outside options, would
be individuals from rural areas, and more speci￿cally women from those rural areas. Individuals
in rural areas of Bangladesh face a higher unemployment rate than those living in urban areas,
and earn lower wages once they ￿nd a job. Among the rural inhabitants, women are the ones who
face the lowest wages and the biggest di¢ culties in ￿nding a job. The fact that currently 98%
of all Grameen Bank￿ s borrowers are women from rural areas supports our theoretical prediction
regarding the composition of the bank￿ s borrowers.
After stating our theoretical results we conduct an empirical analysis using data from a quasi
experimental survey that was jointly conducted by the World Bank and the Bangladesh Institute
of Development Studies during 1998 and 1999. In order to test our theoretical result about the
e⁄ect of borrowers￿future income prospects on the probability of loan repayment, we use three
proxies for the future prospects of the borrower: the borrower￿ s gender, the average wage by gender
in the village in which the borrower lives, and the dowry received by the borrower￿ s family at the
time of the borrower￿ s marriage.
First, we ￿nd evidence consistent with the idea that women repay more often than men. We
claim that the fact that women face higher unemployment rates and lower wages than men drives
this observation. Second, we ￿nd that the average wage by gender in the village is positively and
signi￿cantly correlated with the default probability. Moreover, we ￿nd that including this measure
of expected income reduces the estimated gender gap in loan repayment between female and male
3borrowers. This is consistent with our claim that gender is a proxy of the economic conditions
faced by the borrower. Finally, we argue that the size of the dowry is a good exogenous proxy
for the future prospects of a borrower as higher dowries are positively associated with the wealth
of the family.7 Consistent with our theory, the amount of dowry is found to be positively and
signi￿cantly related to the probability of default, re￿ ecting that individuals with better prospects
are more prone to default on their loans.
Next, we analyze the composition of borrowers by the di⁄erent groups of lenders. We ￿nd that,
compared to other lenders, the Grameen Bank and other micro￿nance institutions lend to a higher
fraction of women and to individuals with lower levels of dowry. This backs our prediction that a
bank that lends to individuals with poor prospects obtains higher repayment rates. However, we
do not ￿nd that micro￿nance institutions lend in villages with lower average wages. We argue that
micro￿nance institutions o⁄er an option to poor individuals which increases their wages. Hence
the observed wage in the village increases when the micro￿nance institution is present.
Finally, we analyze the e⁄ect of the presence of competing banks on the probability of default
of a borrower. In our theoretical model increasing the number of banks allows individuals to access
a pro￿table savings technology even after defaulting on their current loan. Hence, increasing the
availability of banks increases the default rate of borrowers. We ￿nd that borrowers that have
access to other banks have, in fact, a higher probability of default.
Our paper provides a novel reason for the success of the micro￿nance programs by abstracting
from group liability issues and highlighting the deposit side of micro￿nance programs. Moreover,
empirical evidence supports our main theoretical results. Our theoretical setup embeds the reasons
of loan default in a dynamic equilibrium model with overlapping generations of households that
borrow and save, which is a novel approach in the literature on banking for the poor. Moreover,
we analyze the dynamics of a ￿nancially constrained bank in the context of micro￿nance lending.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
7See Anderson (2007) and references therein.
4Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium of the model. Section 4 presents the theoretical results on the
optimal composition of bank￿ s borrowers. Section 5 presents the data that we use in our empirical
analysis. Section 6 presents the empirical results. Finally Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a discrete time, in￿nite horizon economy where dates are denoted by t = 0;1;2::: The
economy consists of an in￿nitely lived agent called the banker and overlapping generations of
individuals living for three dates.
2.1 Individuals
At each date t, a continuum of measure N of penniless individuals are born. They all have the
same preferences for consumption at dates t + 1 and t + 2 described by the function
u(ct+1) + ￿u(ct+2)
where u(c) satis￿es u0(c) > 0 and u00(c) < 0, and ￿ < 1 is an intertemporal discount factor.
Each individual i is characterized by a parameter ￿i which is constant during the individual￿ s
life and unobservable by third parties: The distribution of ￿ among the newborns is described by a
time invariant, continuous distribution function F(￿) with support [￿;￿]. Let f(￿) = F 0(￿) denote
the corresponding density function. Parameter ￿i should be understood as individual i￿ s potential
(labor or informal) income. To simplify the presentation we assume u(￿) = ￿1:
The date in which they are born, individuals have the possibility of investing in a project that
has a unit cost and yields a time invariant deterministic return 1 + ￿ at the following date. In
order to undertake the project, they require a unit loan from a bank at a (net) loan rate l:
At date t, newborn individuals decide whether to borrow in order to undertake the project or
obtain their speci￿c alternative income ￿i:8 At date t + 1 individuals decide whether to repay the
8To lighten notation, subindex i which identi￿es the borrower will be dropped when unnecesary.
5loan and the amount of savings to deposit in the bank. At date t + 2; individuals consume ￿i and
the proceeds from savings if they have saved. Hence, parameter ￿i captures two di⁄erent types of
income. At date t+1; it captures the potential income the individual could obtain from the labor
market, so this can be understood as the outside option of individual. At date t + 2; it mainly
captures the family care the individual expects to receive when old. Although ￿i could potentially
be di⁄erent in both periods, it is reasonable to assume that it will be positively correlated. Richer
families give better opportunities to their young members and also provide better family care when
old. In order to simplify the notation, we assume that this correlation is equal to one and, hence,
￿i is the same at dates t+1 and t+2: The model delivers the same qualitative results if we assumed
positive correlation between ￿i at both dates. Henceforth, we will simply refer to ￿i as the outside
option of individual i.
Defaulting on the loan increases the individual￿ s current income as her earnings are 1 + ￿
instead of ￿￿l. However, by defaulting the individual loses the opportunity to access the savings
technology o⁄ered by the bank and use it to increase her consumption when old. The opportunity
to save is lost because (i) the defaulting individual will not deposit her savings in the bank in order
to avoid their seizure, and (ii) saving other than through bank deposits is not possible.9 Hence,
when the individual does not repay the loan, her income when old is equal to ￿i.
Formally, an individual with outside option ￿ does not default on the loan if the utility from
repaying the loan and saving at a net deposit rate d, Ur(l;d;￿), is higher than the utility from
default, Un(￿). The utility of defaulting on the loan is
Un(￿) = u(1 + ￿) + ￿u(￿):
9This assumption is supported by empirical ￿ndings in Banerjee and Du￿ o (2007). They note that savings
outside of the banking system are not pro￿table in poor countries because of events such as in￿ ations, natural
catastrophes and thefts by strangers or by (male) family members. Our model could incorporate a cost of saving
outside of the banking sector, 1 ￿ ￿: Parameter ￿ should be understood as the probability of losing the savings
when saving outside of the banking industry. For exposition purposes we assume ￿ = 1: Appendix C presents a
model with competing savings alternative.
6The utility from repaying the loan is obtained by solving the following program:
Ur(l;d;￿) = max
s￿0
[u(￿ ￿ l ￿ s) + ￿u(￿ + s(1 + d))]
where s are borrower￿ s savings invested in bank deposits. The ￿rst term of the objective function
is the utility from current consumption after the savings decision has been made. The second term
is the discounted utility from consuming ￿ and the proceeds from savings tomorrow.
In order to simplify the analysis we assume that the gross return of the investment project is
smaller than the gross discount rate, 1+￿ < 1=￿: Since in equilibrium the deposit rate d, will not
exceed the loan rate l, which in turn will not exceed the net return of the project ￿, this implies
1+d < 1=￿: From here it follows that u0(￿) ￿ ￿(1+d)u0(￿); so individuals who do not borrow will
not want to save. We also assume that the upper bound of the support of the distribution satis￿es
￿ ￿ 1+￿: This guarantees that all individuals want to borrow from the bank because by doing so
they can always get Un(￿) = u(1 + ￿) + ￿u(￿); which is greater than u(￿) + ￿u(￿):
In Section 3 we show that there is a threshold b ￿(l;d) such that Un(￿) ￿ Ur(l;d;￿) for all
￿ ￿ b ￿(l;d): In other words, poorer individuals, those with ￿ ￿ b ￿(l;d), are those who repay the
loan. Hence, the fraction of performing loans is given by F(b ￿(l;d)). Finally let s(l;d;￿) denote the
optimal savings of individuals with ￿ ￿ b ￿(l;d):
2.2 The banker
The banker is assumed to be risk neutral and has an initial wealth W < N; which prevents him






where ￿ is the banker￿ s intertemporal discount factor and Ct are the bank￿ s dividend payments at
date t:
7At date t = 0 the banker sets up a bank by providing initial capital with his wealth. The bank
supplies loans and o⁄ers interest bearing deposits to individuals. The bank operates in an economy
with no other external sources of ￿nancing. Hence, it can ￿nance loans only with deposits and
accumulated reserves.
At each date t, the bank sets a loan rate lt; and a deposit rate dt, issues loans in amount Lt
and collects deposits Dt. Loans are supplied to newborns and deposits are the total amount of
savings from those who were granted a loan at date t￿1 and repaid it at date t. When setting loan
and deposit rates the banker takes into account that both variables a⁄ect the optimal decision of
repayment and savings of its borrowers.10 The bank also decides the amount of loans it grants at
every date taking into account that, due to the cash ￿ ow constraint, granting an additional loan
reduces the amount of money he is able to disburse as dividends.








subject to the following constraints





L0 ￿ W (4)
Ct ￿ 0 (5)
The ￿rst constraint is the cash ￿ ow constraint. At any date t, dividend payouts Ct must be equal
to the proceeds from loan repayments plus the new deposits that the bank obtains minus the
deposit repayments the banker has to meet and the new loans that the bank grants.11
10The characterization of how the optimal decision of individuals are a⁄ected by loan and deposit rates is presented
in Section 3.
11Recall that F(b ￿(lt￿1;;dt) is the fraction of loans that do not default at date t:
8The second constraint de￿nes bank￿ s deposits at every date as the optimal savings of the
individuals who repay the loans granted the previous date. The third constraint states that, at
the initial date t = 0, the bank cannot grant more loans than the banker￿ s initial wealth. Finally,
the fourth constraint indicates that the bank cannot pay a negative dividend at any given date t.
3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of the model is de￿ned as a sequence of loan and deposit rates as well as total
loans at each date t that maximizes the discounted stream of dividends of the bank given the
optimal decisions of the individuals.
3.1 Individuals￿optimal decisions
Individuals, when deciding whether they default on the loan or not, take into account the amount
of savings they deposit in the bank in the case of not defaulting. Hence in this subsection we ￿rst
￿nd out the amount of savings individuals would deposit in the bank if they repay and, once we
characterize the optimal savings decision in the case of not defaulting, we analyze the decision of
defaulting on the loan or not.
As previously described, optimal savings s(l;d;￿) result from the optimization problem of those
individuals who repay the loan
s(l;d;￿) = argmax
s￿0
[u(￿ ￿ l ￿ s) + ￿u(￿ + s(1 + d))]
Optimal savings are implicitly de￿ned by the following ￿rst order condition
u
0(￿ ￿ l ￿ s) = ￿(1 + d)u
0(￿ + s(1 + d)): (6)
Let ￿s denote the level of ￿ for which optimal savings are 0, that is ￿s is the value of ￿ for which
u0(￿￿l) = ￿(1+d)u0(￿) holds: Using the implicit function theorem, it follows that for individuals




￿(1 + d)u00(￿ + s(1 + d))
u00(￿ ￿ l ￿ s) + ￿(1 + d)2u00(￿ + s(1 + d))
< 0:
As ￿ decreases individuals increase their savings since savings are used to smooth lifetime con-
sumption and those individuals with a lower ￿ have higher di⁄erences in their earnings.
Once we have determined the optimal savings decisions when individuals repay the loan, we
focus on determining the fraction of borrowers who repay the loan, which in turn de￿nes the
amount of bank deposits.
Taking into account that an individual decides to default when the utility of repaying, Ur(l;d;￿);
is lower than the utility of defaulting on the loan, Un(￿); we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold, b ￿(l;d), for which the individuals with a lower ￿ repay the
loan and the individuals with a higher ￿ do not. Moreover, it holds that b ￿(l;d) < ￿s.






u(￿ ￿ l ￿ s) + ￿u(￿ + s(1 + d)) ￿ u(1 + ￿) ￿ ￿u(￿) for ￿ 2 [￿;￿s]
u(￿ ￿ l) ￿ u(1 + ￿) for ￿ 2 (￿s;￿];
where s = s(l;d;￿) are the optimal savings of individuals. Observe that ￿ is continuous in ￿, by
the continuity of u(c).
Moreover ￿(l;d;￿) is strictly decreasing for all ￿ 2 [￿;￿s): Di⁄erentiating ￿(l;d;￿) and using
the envelope theorem, together with the fact that optimal savings in the range [￿;￿s) are positive




0(￿ + s(1 + d)) ￿ u
0(￿)] < 0.
Finally, ￿(l;d;￿) is positive for ￿ near ￿ as lim
￿!￿
￿(l;d;￿) = +1 by u(￿) = ￿1; and it is clearly
negative for ￿ 2 (￿s;￿]. From the monotonicity of ￿(l;d;￿) and its values on ￿ and ￿s, we conclude
10that there exists a threshold b ￿(l;d), such that ￿(l;d;￿) > 0 when ￿ < b ￿(l;d); which means that
borrowers with ￿ < b ￿(l;d) repay the loan. On the other hand, for individuals with ￿ > b ￿(l;d); it
is satis￿ed that ￿(l;d;￿) < 0; which means that borrowers with ￿ > b ￿(l;d) default on their loan.
The second result follows from the above proof because if ￿(l;d;￿) is strictly decreasing on
[￿;￿s) and ￿(l;d;￿) is negative for ￿s then it must be that b ￿(l;d) < ￿s.
Proposition 1 states that individuals with a low future income ￿, do not default on their loans.
This is because these individuals place more value on an increase in their future consumption. In
order to achieve this they have to deposit their savings in the bank, and if they do not repay the
loan, the bank will seize their deposits as a way to have their loan repaid.12
When setting loan and deposit rates the bank takes into account how they a⁄ect the repayment
behavior of its borrowers. Comparative static results for the threshold that determines the default
rate, b ￿(l;d); are summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 The threshold b ￿(l;d); and consequently the fraction of non defaulting loans in the econ-
omy F(b ￿(l;d)); is decreasing in the loan rate l and increasing in the deposit rate d:
Proof. The threshold b ￿(l;d) is implicitly de￿ned by the equation
u(￿ ￿ l ￿ s) + ￿u(b ￿ + s(1 + d)) = u(1 + ￿) + ￿u(b ￿):
Decreasing (increasing) the loan (deposit) rate increases the left hand side of the equation without
any e⁄ect on the right hand side. Hence the previously indi⁄erent individual is now better o⁄ by
not defaulting on the loan.
Lemma 1 states that individuals with a higher ￿ start to repay their loans when the loan
rate decreases or the deposit rate increases. In such cases the pro￿tability of repayment increases
12In the context of our model the only way an individual can only increase his future income is by saving. Another
approach which yields the same qualitative results would be the assumption of in￿netly lived individuals who receive
a loan whenever they do not default on their previous loan. This setup would however complicate the solution for
the bank optimal decision of loan and deposit rates.
11making it more attractive for the individuals to pay back the loan. The bank will take into account
this e⁄ect when setting the equilibrium loan and deposit rates.
3.2 Bank￿ s optimal strategy
To derive the optimal strategy of the banker we rely on the existence of two commitment devices.
The ￿rst of them is that the banker is able to commit not to receive deposits from those individuals
that do not repay the loan. The second is that the banker repays those deposits that have been
deposited in the bank.
Concerning the ￿rst commitment, it can be argued that it is not optimal for the banker to
repay deposits from individuals who defaulted on their loan. The banker when receiving deposits
from those individuals, has the right not to repay them, as the individual has a debt with the
bank, and by doing so, the banker increases his revenues. Hence, if the individual does not repay
the loan, he wwill not deposit in the bank to avoid the seizure of her deposits.
The second commitment device relies on the assumption that at any given date the continuation
value of the bank is higher than the amount of deposits it has to repay. When a banker does not
repay its deposits the borrowers will not deposit their savings in the bank because they anticipate
that in future dates the bank will do the same. This leads to all individuals defaulting if the bank
does not pay back the deposits, so continuing with the bank will not be pro￿table.13 Hence,
we assume that at any given date the banker is better o⁄ by continuing with the bank than by
defaulting on its deposit repayment obligations.
The optimal strategy of the bank is de￿ned by the amount of loans it grants at each date as
well as the loan and deposit rates that it sets. The ￿rst decision concerns the optimal amount of
loans, which in turn de￿nes the optimal dividend policy since the cash ￿ ow constraint establishes
that by granting an additional unit loan the banker decreases his current dividend by one unit. It
13Note that if this condition did not hold the bank would not be established. Individuals would anticipate bank
behaviour and, by backwards induction, the result would be that individuals would never deposit in the bank, which
would make the bank not pro￿table in the initial date.
12must be taken into account that, due to the banker￿ s intertemporal discount factor, keeping cash
without disbursing it in order to disburse it in the future is not optimal. Thus, all cash that is not
used in granting new loans is paid as dividends to the banker.
When the bank considers granting a loan to a newborn at date t it acknowledges that this
decreases the dividends at date t; but has two additional e⁄ects on future earnings. First, at date
t+1 the bank has higher revenues from loan repayment as a higher number of individuals obtained
a loan. Second, as more individuals get loans, the aggregate supply of deposits at date t + 1 is
higher at the given rates. This e⁄ect has a negative impact at date t + 2 because the bank has to
repay a higher amount of deposits.










Note that the value of expression (7) does not depend on the amount of loans granted and that
the existence of the bank is conditional on it being positive. If (7) were negative then the banker
would refrain from investing any of its initial wealth in the bank. Hence, because expression (7)
is positive when the bank exists, then it is optimal for the bank to increase the loan supply as
long as it has the opportunity of granting a loan to a newborn. This makes constraint (5) in the
banker￿ s problem bind whenever Lt < N. Constraint (4) is also going to be binding, as initially
the bank cannot grant loans to all of the newborns (because W < N):
Once the bank grants loans to all of the young generation N; no further loan disbursement
is pro￿table as the bank can only grant additional loans to old individuals, who always default
as they have no incentives to repay. Hence, whenever the available funds after bank￿ s deposits
have been repaid are higher than the amount needed for granting loans to the new generation,
(1+lt￿1)F(b ￿(lt￿1;dt))Lt￿1+Dt￿(1+dt￿1)Dt￿1 > N; the bank will grant N loans to the newborns
and pay out the rest of the revenues as dividends.
13We can summarize this discussion in the following result.
Proposition 2 As long as there are growth opportunities, Lt < N, dividends are equal to 0. Once
the growth opportunities are exhausted, Lt = N, dividends are positive.
Proposition 2 establishes that when growth opportunities are exhausted (steady state) the bank
is going to have positive cash ￿ ows, which it will pay out as dividends. These dividends are de￿ned
by the following equation:
C = (1 + l
￿)F(b ￿(l
￿;d
￿))N ￿ (1 + d
￿)D ￿ N + D
where l￿ and d￿ are the equilibrium loan and deposit rates in steady state. In order to determine
the optimal dividends we solve the optimal loan and deposit rates that the bank sets at each date.











When setting lt the banker internalizes that increasing the loan rate decreases the repayment rate
of loans, the ￿rst term in square brackets, but increases the payo⁄s from those individuals which
repay, the second term in square brackets. Moreover, increasing the loan rate a⁄ects the amount
of deposits the bank obtains in the next period, which it has to repay two periods after, the last
term in equation (8).






Lt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿(1 + dt))
@Dt
@dt
￿ ￿Dt = 0 (9)
When setting dt the bank internalizes that increasing the deposit rate increases the repayment
of loans granted at t ￿ 1, which increases its revenues at date t; the ￿rst term in equation (9):
The bank also takes into account that increasing the deposit rate a⁄ects the amount of deposits it
receives at a given date and the amount it has to repay at the following date.
14The ￿rst term in equation (9) highlights an interesting feature concerning the complementaries
between loan and deposit rates in this model. As highlighted in Proposition 1, deposit rates have
an incentivizing e⁄ect for the repayment of the current loans. This matches the observed empirical
￿nding that the Grameen Bank o⁄ers a higher deposit rate to its borrowers than the rate o⁄ered by
traditional banks in Bangladesh. The Grameen Bank reports to pay 8.5% deposits to its borrowers
when the average deposit rate for deposits in the Bangladesh banking sector is 5%.14 According
to our model, the reason behind this fact is that the Grameen Bank obtains higher repayments
using deposit rates as an incetivizing device. We argue that traditional banks in Bangladesh, as
they operate in a more competitive environment (urban areas) in which individuals are able to
deposit savings in other banks, do not bene￿t from this e⁄ect and, hence, set a lower deposit rate.
Equations (8) and (9) establish that the optimal loan and deposit rates are constant dur-
ing bank￿ s lifetime and hence, independent of the dividend payout policy. Recall that Dt =
Lt￿1
R ^ ￿(lt￿1;dt)
￿ s(lt￿1;dt;￿)f(￿)d￿ and hence, equations (8) and (9) do not depend on Lt and Lt￿1
respectively. Hence, the bank solves the same system of two equations with two unknowns at each
date t: The main objective when jointly setting lt and dt is to maximize the revenue of the bank
independently of the ￿nal use of this revenue. We can summarize this discussion in the following
result
Proposition 3 Loan rates and deposit rates are constant during bank￿ s lifetime and, hence, inde-
pendent of the dividend payout policy.
The fact that loan and deposit rates are constant sets expression (7) to be constant as well,
which in turn results in an exponential growth of the bank. Recall that as long as growth oppor-
tunities are present the bank invests all of the revenues in increasing the loan supply.
This section has shown that a ￿nancially constrained pro￿t maximizing bank will not pay any
dividends. This is important to be highlighted as it has been argued that the non-disbursement of
14Sources: Central Bank of Bangladesh and Grameen Bank.
15dividends is evidence that the Grameen Bank was not a pro￿t maximizing agent. The conclusion
that when pro￿table investment opportunities are available dividends are equal to zero, closely
matches the fact that the Grameen Bank did not disburse dividends until 2006. From 1983, the
year of its establishment, until 2006 the Grameen Bank has had an increasing presence in the rural
villages of Bangladesh. By the end of 2006, the Grameen Bank was present in over 95% of the rural
villages of Bangladesh. Hence, it can be argued that at this point the Grameen Bank had covered
its entire objective market, and therefore exhausted all of the pro￿table investment opportunities.
In line with our theoretical prediction, at the end of 2006 the Grameen Bank for the ￿rst time in
its history paid dividends. Consistent with our predictions, dividends were also disbursed at the
end of 2007.
Another important issue that our theoretical model highlights is the reinforcement e⁄ect that
the deposit rates have on loan repayment. When such an e⁄ect is taken into account, the optimal
deposit rate is higher which can account for the fact that the Grameen Bank pays a higher deposit
rate than other banks in Bangladesh. This reinforcement e⁄ect, added to the importance of deposits
in a ￿nancially constrained bank, highlights the importance of analyzing lending and borrowing
decisions at the same time in a relationship banking setup.
4 Heterogenous distributions of outside options
Our previous analysis has assumed that the outside option ￿ of all individuals was drawn from
the same cumulative distribution function F(￿). It may be argued that in fact there are di⁄erent
distributions of outside options among di⁄erent types of individuals, for example men and women,
or landowners and landless. As we show in this section being able to di⁄erentiate among types
of individuals with di⁄erent distributions of outside options can be the key to bank￿ s survival, as
only banks that focus on individuals with lower expected income are going to be pro￿table. We
also discuss the di⁄erence between repayment rates and pro￿tability when the bank grants loans
and at the same time o⁄ers deposits.
16In this section we relax the assumption of a unique distribution function and assume that there
are two di⁄erent distributions of outside options.15 We assume that a fraction ￿ of individuals
have their outside option drawn from a distribution F1 and a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ from F2. We assume
that F2 ￿rst-order-stochastically dominates F1, hence F1(￿) > F2(￿) for all ￿. This fact, together
with the results from the previous section, gives the following two Propositions.
Proposition 4 For given l and d a banker who focusses on individuals whose distribution of ￿ is
￿rst-order-stochastically dominated will have higher repayment rates.
Proof. Those individuals for whom their ￿ comes from F1 have worse outside options on average
than those whose ￿ comes from F2. Using Proposition 1, we can show that for a given l and d
the repayment rate is higher for individuals under F1 than for those under F2, i.e. F1(b ￿(l;d)) >
F2(b ￿(l;d)).
At this point the di⁄erence between repayment rates and pro￿ts must be studied. Although
Proposition 4 establishes that repayment rates are higher for banks that grant loans to individuals
under F1 the pro￿ts per loan of the bank focussing on such individuals may not be higher. Let
￿1(l;d) denote the the average pro￿ts per loan from individuals of type F1: Using the exposition
of Section 2 we can de￿ne ￿1(l;d) as
￿1(l;d) = ￿1 + ￿
h
(1 + l)F1(b ￿(l;d)) + S1
i
￿ ￿
2(1 + d)S1 (10)
where S1 =
R ^ ￿(l;d)
￿ s(l;d;￿)f1(￿)d￿ are the average savings per unit of loan and f1 is the density
function of F1:
We have shown that the repayment rates, for given l and d; increase when the bank focusses
on individuals of type F1, which in turn increases the pro￿ts of the bank. However, by focussing
on such individuals, the deposits that the bank has to repay also increase (recall that poorer
individuals save more). This e⁄ect may in turn decrease the pro￿ts of the bank which focusses on
15The qualitative results hold if we assume a higher number of distribution functions.
17individuals with worse outside options.16 Hence, when analyzing the pro￿tability of micro￿nance
institutions the repayment rate is not be the only variable to be taken into account. Attention
should also be paid to the e⁄ect that deposits have on the pro￿ts.
When deposits have a positive e⁄ect on the pro￿ts of the bank, it is obvious that focussing on
individuals of type F1 is optimal as repayment rates increase and also deposits increase. However,
when deposits decrease the pro￿ts of the bank, the bank should impose a maximum amount of
deposits per borrower equal to s(l;d;^ ￿): This will not decrease its repayment rates, as individuals
with ￿ < ^ ￿ will continue to repay their loans (this follows immediately from the proof of Proposition
1) and it will decrease the amount of deposits it obtains. When this measure is taken into account,
it is easy to show that focussing in individuals with the worse distribution of outside options
increases the pro￿tability of the bank.
Let l2;d2 denote the equilibrium loan and deposit rates that maximize ￿2(l;d). By the previous
exposition, when deposits decrease the pro￿ts of the bank, the bank will set a maximum deposit
amount equal to s(l;d;^ ￿(l2;d2)). From equation (10) a bank focussing on distribution F1 and
setting the same loan and deposit rates, and the same maximum amount of deposits per individual
will have higher pro￿ts. Note that the repayment rate increases and the amount of deposits per
individual S1 does not vary.17 Hence we can conclude that by focussing on individuals with worse
outside options the banker will increase his pro￿ts.
From the previous discussion we can conclude that the ability to distinguish between di⁄erent
types of individuals plays a crucial role in the existence of a bank. When F1 and F2 are not
observable by the banker, the banker faces a distribution
Fm(￿) = ￿F1(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)F2(￿):
Following the previous exposition, there may be cases in which a banker that focusses on F1 has
16This occurs when in equilibrium ￿(1 + d) > 1:
17Also it must be take into account that the banker can always set the deposit rate to be 0 and not lose in
deposits.
18positive pro￿ts but the banker focussing on Fm has negative pro￿ts. In this cases the banker able
to distinguish between F1(￿) and F2(￿) will set up a bank and lend only to individuals whose ￿
comes from F1(￿). The banker who observes only Fm(￿) will not ￿nd it pro￿table to set up a bank.
This can be an important issue when establishing a micro￿nance program. For the micro￿nance
program to be pro￿table, the banker must have the ability of distinguishing those individuals with
worse outside options. The banker with such ability will focus on individuals with low outside
options and by doing so increase the pro￿ts of his bank.
5 Data description
To conduct our empirical analysis, we use data from a quasi experimental survey conducted jointly
by the World Bank and the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies. The survey￿ s main
purpose is to provide data for analyzing three micro￿nance programs in Bangladesh: the Grameen
Bank, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, and the Rural Development-12 program
of the Bangladesh Rural Development Board. We analyze the information from the 1998-1999
wave containing information on 15,553 individuals from 2,599 randomly chosen households. These
households come from 96 villages of 32 thanas.18 A detailed description of the survey can be found
in Khandker (1998). The main characteristic that must be highlighted is that it is a cross section,
and hence, we cannot apply panel data techniques to our data.
The survey contains details on personal and ￿nancial characteristics of the individuals in the
surveyed households, as well as on the social and economic characteristics of villages in which these
households live. For the purpose of our empirical analysis we mainly focus on those households
which report taking loans. From the total number of 7,396 loans in the sample, we are able to use
information regarding 6,385 loans. The main reason for this reduction is lack of information on
the date of maturity of these loans, which precludes qualifying the loan as defaulted or not. We
classify a loan as defaulted when one of the following conditions holds: (i) the borrower reported
18Thana is an administrative unit consisting of several villages.
19a reason for default, or (ii) the loan has not been repaid in full 3 months after the due date.19
According to this de￿nition, we classify 768 loans as defaulted in our sample. We conduct our
analysis with a base number of 6,385 observations, which vary depending on the control variables
we use.
For the loans in our analysis, we have detailed information on the features of these loans, e.g.
amount given and repaid, loan rate, dates when they were taken, due and repaid, the lender type,
as well as on the personal and ￿nancial characteristics of the borrowers, like age, education, gender,
number of people providing income in the household, income and savings. It must be taken into
account that reported loans were taken in years ranging from 1993 to 1999. Personal characteristics
of the borrowers (except of age) are available only for loans taken in 1997 and later, as the survey
was conducted in 1998 and 1999, and only information regarding the 12 months preceding the
survey was obtained. This reduces the sample when introducing personal characteristics in our
regressions.
6 Empirical evidence
This section provides empirical evidence in favor of Proposition 1, which states that borrowers with
lower outside options are more creditworthy, and Proposition 4, which states that banks focussing
on individuals with lower outside options exhibit higher repayment rates.
6.1 Higher outside options result in higher defaults
In this subsection, we present evidence on the importance of outside options in determining loan
repayment. Using a logit model with robust standard errors we estimate the impact of three proxies
of borrowers￿outside options on the probability of default. As proxies of outside options we use
the borrower￿ s gender, the average wage in the borrower￿ s village by gender, and the amount of
dowry received by the borrower￿ s family at the time of the borrower￿ s marriage.
19The standard period after which the loan is classi￿ed as defaulted is 3 months. Our results are robust to changes
in the number of months that classi￿es a loan as defaulted.
20When indicated we control in our regressions for the following variables: borrower￿ s age and
education, the borrower￿ s and other household members￿income, the ratio of household members
without income to those providing it (called the dependency ratio), the number of children the
borrower has and the source of loan. The full description of the variables is in Appendix A. The
descriptive statistics are in Table 1.
6.1.1 Gender and expected wages
We claim that in Bangladesh the borrower￿ s gender is a strong predictor of an individual￿ s outside
option. Being born a woman in rural areas of Bangladesh results in lower wages and lower chances
of ￿nding employment.20 This allows us to conclude that the borrower￿ s gender is a good proxy
of the outside option in our model of loan default. We construct a dummy variable that takes a
value 1 for female borrowers. Consistent with our theory we expect female borrowers to have lower
probabilities of default.
Column (1) in Table 2 reports the estimates of the logit regression of default on the borrower￿ s
gender. As expected, the gender￿ s coe¢ cient is negative and signi￿cant. This ￿nding is in line
with the majority of studies on micro￿nance stating that female borrowers are more creditwor-
thy.21 Although several studies have documented this result before, these studies lack an economic
explanation for the underlying causes of this e⁄ect. Various studies have stressed intrinsic charac-
teristics of women, such as being more risk averse than men. In contrast, we argue that di⁄erent
economic conditions lead to di⁄erent repayment behavior by female borrowers. More speci￿cally,
lower outside options imply higher repayment rates.
In order to better assess the importance of gender, we provide in column (2) of Table 2 estimates
from a regression with an extended set of control variables. In this case our sample is reduced to
3,790 observations, mainly because we are only able to use those loans for which we have the data on
20Table 1 shows that the average female wage is smaller than the average male wage. We do not have data on
the unemployment rate in each village needed to compute the expected wage. Statistics from the World Bank state
that female unemployment in rural Bangladesh is 50% higher than male unemployment.
21See Armendariz and Morduch (2005) for a survey of this literature.
21the controls; i.e. we only use loans taken from 1997 onwards. The set of control variables includes
the borrower￿ s age, education, income, income of other members of the borrower￿ s household,
dependency ratio, and number of children.
The impact of gender is still negative and signi￿cant re￿ ecting, according to our proposed
interpretation, the e⁄ect of women￿ s lower outside options. The borrower￿ s education, which can
be regarded as a proxy for skills, also has a positive and signi￿cant impact on the default probability.
The income generated by the borrower and other members of the borrower￿ s household, as well
as the dependency ratio, are meant to control for individual and household exposure to speci￿c
shocks such as natural catastrophes or medical needs. The coe¢ cients on the income variables
are not signi￿cant. The coe¢ cient on the dependency ratio is positive and signi￿cant, re￿ ecting
that, when a higher fraction of members do not generate income, the borrower is more vulnerable
to negative shocks such as a medical expenditure and more likely to default. Finally, we also
introduce the number of children as a control variable, although it is not signi￿cant.
As we have previously argued, women have lower wages than men in rural Bangladesh, and this
can be one important factor explaining the gender gap in loan repayment. To further address this
issue, we create a variable which is the average wage that the individuals receive in each village by
gender. This measure is a proxy for the expected wage of the borrower and, by construction, it is
no longer borrower speci￿c since all borrowers of the same gender who live in the same village are
imputed the same wage. All individuals surveyed, independently of having borrowed or not, report
the wages they earned while working as employees in the non-agricultural sector. By averaging
these wages by gender in each village we construct a proxy for the outside option of the borrower.
Column (3) in Table 2 reports the results of the regression of default on the average wages
in the village while preserving the gender dummy. It shows that for both men and women the
coe¢ cient on the average wage is positive and signi￿cant, which is in line with our Proposition
1. The following regression reported in column (4) con￿rms the previous results when we add
the controls used in previous regressions. In this regression the education loses its positive and
22signi￿cant sign. It may well be that education proxies for the e⁄ect of wages at least to some
extent. It is reasonable to assume that villages with high wages will also have more education, as
wages and education are known to be positively correlated.
As we have just shown, introducing economic factors such as the borrower￿ s expected wage
in the village helps to explain the gender gap in loan repayment. This is consistent with our
explanation of gender being a proxy for the outside option of the borrowers, and di⁄ers from other
informal explanations in the literature.
6.1.2 Dowry
In order to better assess the importance of borrowers￿outside options for their repayment behavior
we use the dowry exchanged in the marriage. The literature concerning dowry has documented that
wealthier families pay higher dowries and that the dowry received by the borrower￿ s family increases
with her/his expected income.22 In the context of our model, coming from a wealthier family
increases the outside option of the borrower because wealthier families are able to provide better
prospects for their relatives. This ranges from o⁄ering better labor opportunities to providing
monetary and in kind transfers in case of need.
Our dowry variable is constructed in such a way that both spouses in the marriage have the
same imputed dowry. Hence, it is not going to be suitable to explain the gender gap. However, it
is suitable to test Proposition 1 regarding the importance of the outside options in loan repayment
behavior.
Column (1) in Table 3 reports the estimates from a regression of default on dowry. The sample
is reduced to 5421 loans as only for this number of loans we have reports on the amount of dowry
exchanged. It must also be taken into account that not all borrowers are married. In this regression
we also include the gender dummy. The coe¢ cient on the dowry is positive and signi￿cant. As
reported in column (2) of Table 3 this result is robust to including the controls used in the previous
22See Anderson (2007) for a survey of the literature.
23regressions.
As we have previously argued, dowry can be interpreted as a measure of the expected future
income of the individuals. Following such reasoning the current income of the individuals can
be instrumented by dowry in order to control for unobservable shocks that are related to current
income and default, like robbery and natural catastrophes. In such case dowry would capture
the part of the individuals income which is not a⁄ected by the shocks, which can be seen as the
expected outside option of the borrower. Column (3) shows the result of a probit estimation in
which the variable income has been instrumented by the dowry exchanged by the individuals.23
The results of such estimations is that higher income, once instrumented, leads to higher default.
6.1.3 Robustness check concerning dowry
One concern while using dowry as a proxy for outside options is the high percentage of reports
of no dowry being received. Marriages reporting no dowry received account for around 50%
of the sample. In order to control for di⁄erent explanations why no dowry was given, such as
being extremely poor and not being able to raise money for a dowry or having di⁄erent marriage
traditions, we run our regression on a constrained sample of borrowers reporting a positive dowry.
Column (4) in Table 3 shows the results of this robustness check. It can be seen that restricting
our sample only to individuals with a positive dowry does not change our results.
Another concern regarding the dowry is the possible existence of misbehavior by the borrowers
receiving dowry. A dowry exchange is illegal in Bangladesh meaning that a person engaging in
such a practice may be also prone to commit other illegal acts which may positively correlate
with default, including strategic defaults. In order to test this explanation we generate a dummy
re￿ ecting whether a dowry was actually exchanged. This dummy proxies for the possibility that
the individual may be prone to other misbehavior. We run a regression of default with the usual
controls and the dowry dummy. Results are reported in column (5). The coe¢ cient on the dowry
23Due to programming di¢ culties we could not conduct a logit estimation with instrumental variables. It must
be highlighted that results of probit estimations do not have quantitative impact on the value of our regressors.
24dummy is insigni￿cant, meaning that the e⁄ect of a dowry is related to the levels of the variable
and not to the existence or not of a dowry. This allows us to conclude that the channel through
which the dowry a⁄ects repayment rates is related to the outside options of the borrowers.
Although the dowry exchange is nowadays illegal in Bangladesh, we do not expect to have a
mismeasurement of the variable dowry. As the survey was not conducted by organizations capable
of punishing the individuals, the incentives to lie are not clear. One of the main e⁄ects of having
dowries misreported is that it would bias the coe¢ cient of dowry towards 0, making it more di¢ cult
to ￿nd positive e⁄ects. The biggest concern would be that only individuals with high levels of dowry
reported low levels of dowry and those with intermediate levels did not misreport. We argue that
this is not the case in our sample as individuals have the same incentives to misreport independently
of their dowry, and hence, we should not have non monotonicities in the misreporting. As we use
the dowry mostly as a ranking mechanism the important assumption is that if misreporting of
dowry exists in the survey, this does not a⁄ect the ranking. Hence, if misreporting exists, we
assume that on average individuals with higher dowry have higher reported dowry.
6.1.4 All proxies
In the last column of Table 3 we report the estimates of a regression including all proxies for
outside options and all controls. All coe¢ cients used as proxies of outside options preserve their
signs. The most important result of that regression is that the impact of the gender dummy is
strongly reduced and it looses its signi￿cance. The loss in signi￿cance backs further our result
that being a female borrower translates into low outside options. This supports Proposition 1 and
goes against the informal explanations addressing the gender gap in repayment behavior. The loss
of signi￿cance is in line with a claim posed by Armendariz and Murdoch (2005) who argue that,
having controlled for su¢ cient amount of borrowers￿characteristics, gender will not matter for the
repayment behavior of the borrowers.
256.2 Borrowers￿composition depends on institutions
Next, we focus on empirical evidence consistent with section 4. In order to support this result we
conduct a test of di⁄erence in means concerning the percentage of female borrowers, the level of
dowry of the borrowers and the expected wages by gender in the village. We also test if micro￿nance
institutions have a lower fraction of defaulting loans.
Table 4 shows that, as predicted by our model, we ￿nd that the Grameen Bank exhibits higher
repayment rates and focuses on borrowers with lower outside options. The micro￿nance institutions
have a statistically signi￿cant higher amount of female borrowers and the average dowry exchanged
by a borrower in the micro￿nance institution is lower than for the other lenders. Concerning the
expected wage in the village, we see that the micro￿nance institutions do not focus on villages with
lower wages. This however may be the result of the micro￿nance institutions￿lending practices.
By lending in those villages, the supply of cheap labor is reduced and the equilibrium wage of the
village is increased.
6.2.1 Controlling for the lender type
It can be argued that, due to the di⁄erent selection procedure followed by the institutions, our
previous proxies for the outside options of the borrower were in fact proxies for the lender type,
mainly those regarding female and dowry. The problem of selection in the micro￿nance programs
has been previously treated in the micro￿nance literature by authors such as Khandker.24 In order
to test whether our results are stable after controlling for the lender type, we introduce a dummy
indicating the type of the lender. There are several sources of lending indicated in the sample and
we pool them into six groups, which indicate the common features of these lenders. These groups
are micro￿nance institutions, relatives, moneylenders, cooperatives of credit, traditional banks and
non-governmental agencies. Table 5 presents estimates of four regressions: three for each of the
measures of outside options taken separately and one that contains all of them. We conclude that
24See Khandker and Pitt (1998).
26our results do not change. In all regressions the gender coe¢ cient becomes small in absolute value
(and looses signi￿cancy in all but one regression), which can be attributed to the fact that the
majority of borrowers of micro￿nance institutions are women.
In order to assess the importance of all of our regressions only for the Grameen Bank borrowers
we report the results of our estimations when only the borrowers of the Grameen Bank are taken
into account. Table 6 shows how the qualitative results remain unchanged. Interestingly, the
signs of age and education do change because when individuals become older they receive a higher
loan and also they receive education. Hence, these variables can be seen as predictors of being
a previous Grameen Bank borrower and not having defaulted on the loan before. In order to
study this point, we include the size of the loan, which increases with the years of membership
and previous repayment behavior, and we see how these coe¢ cients loose signi￿cance. Results of
including the loan amount are shown in column (3) of Table 6
6.3 The impact of competition
The theoretical predictions about the repayment behavior in our model are based on the sole
existence of a monopolistic bank. The enforcement mechanism which guarantees loan repayment
relies on the existence of one unique source of pro￿table saving technology. In our model, the
inclusion of a second bank o⁄ering a savings technology results in a lower repayment rate of the
original bank.25 Individuals would default on the loan and deposit their savings in the other bank.
Hence, in the case of the micro￿nance industry, our model predicts that when additional channels
of pro￿table savings are available, the repayment rate decreases.
Empirically the e⁄ect of bank competition on the repayment behavior of individuals can be
tested by generating an indicator of the availability of pro￿table saving technologies in a given
village. In order to proxy for the availability of another bank, we construct a dummy that takes
the value 1 if any individual in the village took a loan from a traditional bank. Implicitly we are
25For a theoretical model that supports this claim see the Appendix C.
27assuming that traditional banks o⁄er deposits at a competitive rate to all individuals that are
willing to deposit their savings in the bank. This allows us to proxy for villages that have access to
other sources of saving technology than those of the micro￿nance institutions. Our model predicts
villages with other sources of pro￿table saving technology should have higher default rates than
those with out such options.
Consistent with our theory, we ￿nd how living in villages with accessibility to bank services
has a positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the probability of failure of the individuals. These results
are reported on Table 7.
6.4 Further tests
Our theoretical setup has other testable implications that can be tested in the data. To test these
implications we conduct di⁄erence in means tests for such cases. Results of this tests are reported
in Table 8.
One empirical prediction of our model is that individuals who default will have lower savings,
as they will not deposit their savings in the bank in order to avoid seizure. This pattern is observed
in the data because those individuals who default have on average lower savings than those who
do not. Our model also predicts that defaulting borrowers have higher income in the date they
default. This is an important feature which distinguishes our theoretical model of strategic default
from competing explanations. If defaults were only due to exogenous shocks, we would expect
borrowers receiving a negative shock, i.e. disease or bad climate, would default but also have less
income. In our model, those who default strategically have higher income than those that do not
default.
The empirical ￿nding concerning the income of defaulting borrowers supports our model, as
the average income of those who default is higher than of those that repay. The data show that
borrowers who committed default in years before 1998 (the year when the survey was conducted)
have higher income in the years after their default (1998 or 1999) than those who did not default.
28This is in line with our theoretical setup as we show that borrowers with better outside options in
the following years are more prone to default.
Consistent with our theory, and previous theories regarding borrowing and lending behavior,
when individuals have options of depositing their savings, or receiving new credit from other
institutions, defaulting on the loan a⁄ects less their future income. We ￿nd how among individuals
that default, those who have access to alternative banks have higher income than those who do
not have such options.
Also consistent with such theories when an individual does not default on the loan from the
micro￿nance institution, the existence of other sources of credit does not a⁄ect its income as it
continues to use the original source.
Regarding savings we ￿nd that those individuals who receive a loan by micro￿nance institutions
have higher average savings than those who do not, this is also consistent with our theory as
micro￿nance institutions have higher deposit rates and focus on those who have higher needs of
savings. Also we ￿nd how the savings pro￿le of the individuals follows the pattern predicted by
our model. Young individuals accumulate savings that are used when they are old. This prediction
is not new, as numerous studies studying the life cycle pro￿le of savings predict such a pattern.
Another important result is that those individuals that are members of a micro￿nance pro-
gram generally save inside such a program. In our sample 70% of those who are members have all
their savings inside the program. It is interesting to note how, when other banks are available, the
amount of savings of the micro￿nance programs￿members out of the program increases. Moreover,
individuals who do not repay their loans have a higher amount of their savings out of the micro-
￿nance programs. In addition, those that do not save at all inside of the micro￿nance program
possess higher savings too. Such individuals can be characterized as being rich with better options
of savings inside the traditional banking system.
297 Conclusions
Micro￿nance programs achieve high repayment rates although their borrowers are extremely poor
and do not provide collateral. Recent studies have stressed that group liability, which has been
the most common explanation for this observation, does not have an impact on micro￿nance
repayment rates. Our paper provides a simple and tractable model of borrowers with di⁄erent
expected labor or informal income, henceforth outside option, and a monopolistic bank facing
asymmetric information. We identify the optimal default strategy for borrowers and the optimal
lending and deposit taking strategy for the bank. Then, we exploit theoretical predictions from
our model to design empirical tests addressing two hypotheses: (i) does the probability of default
increase with the borrowers￿outside option? and (ii) do lenders with higher repayment rates focus
on individuals with worse outside options? We test these hypotheses using the data from a quasi
experimental survey from Bangladesh.
From a theoretical perspective we show how in a dynamic model in which the bank takes
deposits and grants loans to the same set of individuals, the deposit rate plays a crucial role in
enhancing loan repayment. Borrowers who repay are those with lower expected future incomes, as
they place more value on the increase in future consumption that savings provide. Hence, higher
deposit rates increase the pro￿tability of the savings mechanism which increases the incentives for
the borrowers to repay, as in the case of defaulting they will not have access to bank￿ s deposits.
Empirically we ￿nd that those individuals with worse outside options are in fact those with
higher repayment rates. We use three proxies for the outside options of individuals: the borrower￿ s
gender, the average wage by gender in the village, and the dowry exchanged in the borrower￿ s
wedding. We also ￿nd that, consistent with our theoretical model, micro￿nance institutions focus
on borrowers with lower outside options and obtain higher repayment rates.
Our paper provides interesting policy implications. When designing a sustainable micro￿nance
program the policy-maker should be able to identify and focus on those individuals with worse
30outside options, which in turn are poorer individuals. By doing so the micro￿nance institution will
obtain higher repayment rates which is crucial in obtaining a sustainable institution. However,
depending on the equilibrium deposit rate, the micro￿nance institution may need to establish a
maximum amount of deposits per borrower in order to increase his pro￿ts without decreasing his
repayment rates
The placement of the micro￿nance program should take into account the existence of alternative
institutions that provide credit and savings to the individuals, since we show how such presence
reduces the repayment rate of the individuals. This highlights the risks that the expansion of
micro￿nance may have on their pro￿tability. Introducing micro￿nance programs in places where
other institutions already o⁄er credit and deposits would probably result in low repayment rates,
and hence unsustainability, not only for the incumbent but also for the institution that was present
before.
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33Appendix A - De￿nitions of Variables
Default: is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the loan is not repaid 3 months after
its due date
Female: is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the borrower is a woman.
Income: is the income of the borrower which he obtained in the last 12 months. Income is the
sum of income from all the sources given in the data (self employment, dependent employment,
obtained ￿nancial help and pensions).
Income others: is the sum of the income obtained by the other people in the borrower￿ s house-
hold.
Savings: are the savings the borrower reported.
Average wage (female/male): is the average wage in non agricultural activities in the village
of the borrower by gender.
Dependency ratio: is the ratio of the number of individuals not obtaining any income to those
obtaining in the household.
Age: is the borrower￿ s age when he was granted the loan.
Education: is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the borrower reports positive number
of years of attending the school or taking part in educational activities o⁄ered by e.g. NGOs. We
use the dummy because these other education activities cannot be coded as a concrete number of
education years.
Micro￿nance group: is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the loan comes from one of the
micro￿nance institutions reported in the sample.
NGO group: is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the loan comes from one of the non govern-
mental organizations reported in the sample.
Relatives group: is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the loan comes from one of the relatives.
Banks: is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the loan comes from one of the commercial banks
34reported in the sample.
Bank availability: is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if someone in the village accessed
commercial banking services
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the variables
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables that are going to be used in our future analysis.
The descriptive statistics are shown for those observations in which a loan was taken. It must be taken
into account that for some of our analysis some variables are constructed using information of observations
in which no loan was taken. Examples of this are the average wage of female and male individuals.
Variable Mean Std deviation Min Max Observations
Default 0.120 0.325 0 1 6385
Female 0.748 0.434 0 1 6385
Dowry 0.161 0.391 0 5 5421
Average wage female 27.652 10.470 6 60 2188
Average wage male 76.464 26.454 35 150 1484
Age 37.766 11.151 5 85 6385
Education 0.349 0.476 0 1 6385
Income 0.086 0.268 -0.278 3.995 6385
Income others 0.411 0.633 -0.317 14.103 6385
Dependency ratio 2.482 1.779 0 12 6285
Micro￿nance group 0.521 0.499 0 1 6385
NGO group 0.077 0.268 0 1 6385
Relatives group 0.357 0.479 0 1 6385
Commercial lender group 0.038 0.192 0 1 6385
Cooperatives of credit 0.004 0.063 0 1 6385
Bank availability 0.488 0.499 0 1 21643
Savings 0.027 0.045 0 0.855 6385
35Appendix B - Regression Tables
Table 2. Logit regressions of default
This table presents logit regressions with robust standard errors of the dichotomic variable Default on the
reported variables. For an explanation of the construction of the variables please refer to Appendix A.
For those regressions in which controls other than Female and Age are included the sample is restricted
to those loans that were undertook from 1997 onwards as the control variables were not available for
previous dates. We report robust standard errors in parentheses with *** ,**, * representing coe¢ cients
signi￿cant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -1.543*** -1.507*** -1.207** -0.921
(0.0797) (0.133) (0.544) (0.565)
Average female wage 0.0371*** 0.0307***
(0.00894) (0.00908)






Income others -0.188 -0.0938
(0.134) (0.159)
Dependency ratio 0.109*** 0.121***
(0.0295) (0.0389)




Constant -1.020*** -2.434*** -2.638*** -3.738***
(0.0565) (0.261) (0.453) (0.570)
Observations 6385 3790 1678 1654
Pseudo R2 0.0792 0.126 0.133 0.164
36Table 3. Regressions using dowry as a proxy of the outside option
This table presents logit regressions with robust standard errors of the dichotomic variable Default on the
reported variables. This table shows the positive correlation between the variable Dowry and Default.
For an explanation of the construction of the variables please refer to Appendix A. For those regressions
in which controls other than Female and Age are included the sample is restricted to those loans that
were undertook from 1997 onwards as the control variables were not available for previous dates. Column
(3) reports the estimates of an instrumental probit regression where Income is instrumented by Dowry.
We report robust standard errors in parentheses with *** ,**, * representing coe¢ cients signi￿cant at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female -1.565*** -1.605*** -0.0402 -1.809*** -1.606*** -0.986
(0.0900) (0.157) (0.399) (0.277) (0.157) (0.602)
Dowry 0.345*** 0.364*** 0.416*** 0.314** 0.221
(0.0915) (0.119) (0.145) (0.131) (0.152)
Average male wage 0.0294***
(0.0105)
Average female wage 0.0220***
(0.00645)
Age 0.0121 -0.00260 0.00600 0.0129 -0.00347
(0.00878) (0.00504) (0.0168) (0.00885) (0.0144)
Income -0.0921 1.993** -1.137*** -0.0982 -0.0774
(0.184) (0.793) (0.287) (0.184) (0.236)
Income others -0.305* -1.142*** -0.300* -0.304
(0.181) (0.416) (0.182) (0.241)
Dependency ratio 0.0134 0.00789 0.0108 0.0155 -0.0118
(0.0356) (0.0170) (0.0661) (0.0357) (0.0577)
Number of children 0.0845*** 0.0493*** 0.149** 0.0852*** 0.0358
(0.0326) (0.0163) (0.0693) (0.0325) (0.0460)
Education 0.235** 0.0253 0.281 0.248** 0.00682
(0.117) (0.0591) (0.195) (0.118) (0.188)
Dummy Dowry 0.114
(0.145)
Constant -1.160*** -2.062*** -1.457*** -1.528*** -2.139*** -2.749***
(0.0670) (0.348) (0.198) (0.579) (0.364) (0.698)
Observations 5421 3221 3221 1186 3221 1401
Pseudo R2 0.0859 0.120 0.125 0.139 0.120 0.137 37Table 4. Means of the variables depending on the lender type
This table presents the means of Default Female Dowry Average wage female (awagef) and average wage
male (awagem) depending on the source of the loan. We report the ttest of the di⁄erence in means when
the source of the loan is a micro￿nance institution or not.
Group Default Female Dowry Awagef Awagem
Non micro￿nance 0.25 0.48 0.22 27.65 73.54
Micro￿nance institution 0.07 0.83 0.14 27.64 79.01
t-statistic 15.16 -25.75 5.57 0.03 -4.46
38Table 5. Regressions controlling for di⁄erent sources of credit
This table presents logit regressions with robust standard errors of the dichotomic variable Default on
the reported variables. For an explanation of the construction of the variables refer to Appendix A. We
report robust standard errors in parentheses with *** ,**, * representing coe¢ cients signi￿cant at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.191 -0.487** -0.00233 -0.412
(0.182) (0.204) (0.679) (0.686)
Dowry 0.297** 0.249
(0.141) (0.177)
Average wage female 0.0306*** 0.0308***
(0.00940) (0.0108)
Average wage male 0.0197*** 0.0189***
(0.00718) (0.00694)
Age 0.0144*** -0.000377 0.00933 -0.0251
(0.00469) (0.00944) (0.00872) (0.0163)
Income 0.0341 -0.0267 -0.271 -0.267
(0.163) (0.180) (0.224) (0.238)
Income others -0.111 -0.220 0.0324 -0.0715
(0.121) (0.170) (0.164) (0.228)
Dependency ratio 0.0915*** -0.000827 0.0485 -0.0828
(0.0296) (0.0377) (0.0421) (0.0590)
Number of children -0.00188 0.0917** -0.0557 0.0836
(0.0229) (0.0368) (0.0352) (0.0530)
Education -0.0165 0.0383 -0.253 -0.151
(0.118) (0.129) (0.190) (0.206)
micro￿nance -2.000*** -1.211** -1.946*** -1.387
(0.376) (0.516) (0.541) (0.874)
NGO -2.292*** -1.614*** -2.301*** -1.724*
(0.435) (0.568) (0.635) (0.951)
Relatives 0.536 1.059** 0.616 1.022
(0.368) (0.511) (0.499) (0.847)
Banks 0.0629 0.614 0.0728 0.568
(0.378) (0.521) (0.509) (0.855)
Constant -1.455*** -1.585** -2.138*** -1.427
(0.451) (0.617) (0.801) (1.102)
Observations 3790 3221 1654 1401
Pseudo R2 0.228 0.204 0.259 0.228 39Table 6. Logit regressions of default for Grameen Bank borrowers
This table presents logit regressions with robust standard errors of the dichotomic variable Default on the
reported variables only for borrowers of the Grameen Bank. For an explanation of the construction of
the variables please refer to Appendix A. For those regressions in which controls other than Female and
Age are included the sample is restricted to those loans that were undertook from 1997 onwards as the
control variables were not available for previous dates. We report robust standard errors in parentheses
with *** ,**, * representing coe¢ cients signi￿cant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Variable (1) (2) (3)






Age -0.0102 -0.0288 -0.0125
(0.0109) (0.0186) (0.0181)
Income -0.368 -0.723* -0.670
(0.318) (0.403) (0.427)
Income others -1.212** -0.997** -0.477
(0.501) (0.483) (0.409)
Dependency ratio -0.00455 -0.00996 0.0541
(0.0610) (0.0677) (0.0682)
Number of children 0.0581 0.137** 0.0894
(0.0471) (0.0617) (0.0598)
Education -0.147 -0.119 -0.0742
(0.213) (0.223) (0.227)
Constant -1.730*** -1.211* -0.793
(0.519) (0.729) (0.729)
Observations 1966 1683 1683
Pseudo R2 0.0288 0.0419 0.0718
40Table 7. Regressions controlling for availability of banks
This table presents a logit regression with robust standard errors of the dichotomic variable Default on
the reported variables. For an explanation of the construction of the variables please refer to Appendix A.
For those regressions in which controls other than Female and Age are included the sample is restricted to
those loans that were undertook from 1997 onwards as the control variables were not available for previous
dates. This table shows the positive correlation between bank availability and Default. We report robust

























41Appendix C - Model with competing alternative savings
This section analyses the individuals decision in a context in which the individual has the oppor-
tunity of accessing a savings technology di⁄erent for that of the monopolistic bank of our main
section.
In this section the individual has the opportunity of accessing a savings technology di⁄erent
from that of the monopolistic bank. With this savings technology the individual receives 1 + r
for every unit of savings. We assume that the realization of this opportunity of savings is not
observable by the original bank. If not the original bank would o⁄er di⁄erent deposit and loan
rates to those individuals which have the opportunity to save.
Hence the decision of defaulting on the loan granted by the original bank, following the same
intuition as in the main section, can be characterized as
u(￿ ￿ l ￿ so) + u(￿ + so(1 + d)) ￿ [u(1 + ￿ ￿ sz) + u(￿ + sz(1 + r))] < 0
where so are the optimal savings of the individual in the monopolistic bank and sz are the savings
under the new alternative.
The threshold for the individual that defaults is de￿ned as ~ ￿: Where ~ ￿ is such that
u(￿ ￿ l ￿ so) + u(￿ + so(1 + d)) = u(1 + ￿ ￿ sz) + u(￿ + sz(1 + r)):
Hence, in a model with alternative savings technologies the fraction of individuals that do not
default will be F(~ ￿).
Recall that ^ ￿ is the threshold of default for those individuals that do not have an alternative
savings technology. It can be proved that F(~ ￿) ￿ F(^ ￿); so when a pro￿table source of savings
is included the default rate of the monopolistic bank increases. This is because individuals can
default on the monopolistic bank and deposit their savings in the other savings technology.
Lemma 5 When an alternative savings technology is introduced the default rate of the monopolistic
42bank (weakly) increases.
Proof. When r ￿ d; or in other words, when the alternative technology o⁄ers the same or higher
deposit rate as the monopolistic bank, then the default rate of the economy increases. More
precisely in our setup the default rate goes to 1, which would in equilibrium mean that no bank
would grant loans to the individuals in the ￿rst period.
It is direct to show that, when r ￿ d; then
u(￿ ￿ l ￿ so) + u(￿ + so(1 + d)) < u(1 + ￿ ￿ sz) + u(￿ + sz(1 + r)):
When sz = so then u(￿ + so(1 + d)) ￿ u(￿ + sz(1 + r)) and u(￿ ￿ l ￿ so) < u(1 + ￿ ￿ sz):
Therefore the above inequality holds: The individual can always have the same income when old
and increase his income when young by defaulting. Hence, the individual is better o⁄ defaulting
on the loan of the monopolistic bank and saving in the alternative technology independently of its
outside option ￿:
When r < d the default rate of the economy may not increase. But it will never decrease as
the individuals can always choose not to save through the new savings mechanism and then he
would in fact react as if the new savings mechanism was not present. The default rate increases if
the individual previously indi⁄erent in defaulting now prefers to default. This happens when the
following condition holds
u(￿ ￿ l ￿ so) + u(^ ￿ + so(1 + d)) < u(1 + ￿ ￿ sz) + u(^ ￿ + sz(1 + r)) (11)
When r < d this condition (11) may not hold. If the alternative strategy o⁄ers a low savings
rate then individuals with ^ ￿ may continue to ￿nd it pro￿table to repay and save with better
deposit rates than to default and use the new savings mechanism. Condition (11) holds whenever
sz(l;r;^ ￿) = 0, that is when individuals with ^ ￿ do not ￿nd it pro￿table so save under the alternative
technology. When sz(l;r;^ ￿) = 0 then by de￿nition it is satis￿ed that u(1+￿￿sz)+u(^ ￿+sz(1+r)) =
43u(1 + ￿) + u(^ ￿); which recall de￿ned ^ ￿ in the ￿rst place. On the other hand if sz(l;r;^ ￿) > 0 then
it is satis￿ed that u(1 + ￿ ￿ sz) + u(^ ￿ + sz(1 + r)) > u(1 + ￿) + u(^ ￿). In this case the individual
with ^ ￿ is better o⁄ by defaulting and therefore the default rate of the economy increases. In such
case the indi⁄erent individual will be de￿ned by ~ ￿ such that
u(￿ ￿ l ￿ so) + u(~ ￿ + so(1 + d)) = u(1 + ￿ ￿ sz) + u(~ ￿ + sz(1 + r)):
Where ~ ￿ < ^ ￿.
44Appendix D - Di⁄erence in means tests
Table 8. Further tests of the model
This table presents the results of doing di⁄erence in means tests of the reported variables. We
denote as 1 those individuals for which the described condition is satis￿ed.
Description 0 1 p-value
Level of savings if the individual defaulted 0.029 0.017 1
Level of income if the individual defaulted 0.073 0.179 0
Level of income if the individual defaulted on a loan expected prior to 1998 0.061 0.11 0.002
Level of income when the individual committed early default by bank presence 0.065 0.15 0
Level of income when the individual did not default by bank presence 0.072 0.075 0.35
Savings when individual committed early default on a Grameen loan by bank presence 0.008 0.012 0.03
Savings when no default was committed on a Grameen loan by bank presence 0.034 0.036 0.13
Income when early default was committed in Grameen loan by bank presence 0.049 0.107 0
Income when no default was committed in a Grameen loan by bank presence 0.076 0.03 1
Savings if the individual has a loan from the Grameen Bank 0.02 0.033 0
45